China at the beginning of 3rd millennium: geopolitical perspectives by Florin Pintescu & Adrian Botezatu
Copyright © 2012 „Codrul Cosminului”, XVIII, 2012, No. 2, p. 329-346
CHINA AT THE BEGINNING OF 3
RD MILLENNIUM:
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Florin Pintescu
“Ştefan cel Mare” University, Suceava,
florinp@atlas.usv.ro
Adrian Botezatu
“Al. I. Cuza” University, Iaşi
adihexis@yahoo.com
“May you live in interesting times”
1
Rezumat: Articolul  prezintă  şi  analizează  succint principalele  atuuri  geoistorice,
geoeconomice şi geostrategice ale Chinei, în încercarea sa de a deveni putere hegemonică
regională  şi, în circumstanţe speciale,  mondială. Mai  întâi  este  prezentat  un  background
istoric al acestei ţări, sursă de auto-încredere şi de naştere a „mentalităţii chineze”, diferită
de cea occidentală. În continuare, este prezentată esenţa strategiei navale (Haijun Zhanlue)
chineze  contemporane,  element  esenţial  al  geostragiei  actuale  a  acestei  ţări.  Politicile şi
resursele economice ale ţării – elemente fundamentale ale geopoliticii sale – beneficiază de o
tratare mai amănunţită. Partea finală a articolului trece în revistă şi analizează avantajele şi
dezavantajele strategice, politica faţă de Asia Centrală şi obiectivul fundamental al Chinei –
dobândirea calităţii de hegemon regional.
În  concluzie,  autorii  consideră  că  pentru  a  deveni  prima  superputere  a  lumii  în
următoarele  2-3 decenii,  China  are  nevoie  de un amestec  de  conducere  genială,  creştere
economică, modernizare (nu occidentalizare), mentalitate chineză şi „calea chineză a vieţii”
(ultimele două bazate pe Tao). Dacă un singur element al acestei combinaţii nu va funcţiona
cum trebuie, acest „vis chinez” nu va putea fi îndeplinit.
Abstract: The  paper  presents and briefly  examines the  main  geohistorical,
geoeconomic  and geostrategic  advantages  of  China,  related  to  this attempt to  become a
regional hegemonic power and, in special circumstances, a worldwide superpower. First, is
presented a historical background of the country, a source of self-confidence and rise of the
so-called “Chinese mentality”, different of Western mentality. Further is shown the essence of
the Chinese contemporary naval strategy (Haijun Zhanlue), currently an essential element of
geostrategy of this country. Policies and economic resources of the country – the fundamental
elements of its geopolitics – are more detailed presented. The final part of the article reviews
and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of strategic policy towards Central Asia and
China’s fundamental goal – gaining of the regional hegemonic power status.
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In conclusion, the authors consider that in order to become the first superpower of the
world  in  the  next  2-3  decades,  China  needs a  mixture  of  brilliant  leadership,  economic
growth, modernization (not Westernization!), Chinese mentality and “Chinese way of life”
(last two based on Tao). If a single element of this combination will not work properly, this
“Chinese dream” will not be achieved.
Résumé: L’article  ci-joint  présente  et  analyse  de  manière  succincte  les  principaux
atouts  géohistoriques,  géoéconomiques  et  géostratégiques  de  la  Chine,  dans  son  essai  de
devenir une puissance hégémonique régionale et, dans des circonstances spéciales, mondiale.
Premièrement, on y présenta un background historique de ce pays, source d’auto-confiance et
de naissance de la “mentalité chinoise”, différente de celle occidentale. Ensuite, on présenta
l’essence de la stratégie navale (Haijun Zhanlue) chinoise contemporaine, élément essentiel
de la géostratégie actuelle de ce pays. Les politiques et les ressources économiques du pays –
éléments fondamentaux de sa géopolitique – bénéficièrent d’un abord plus détaillé. La partie
finale de l’article passe en revue et analyse les avantages et les désavantages stratégiques, la
politique envers l’Asie Centrale et l’objectif fondamental de la Chine – acquérir la qualité de
hégémon régional.
En conclusion, les auteurs considèrent que, pour que la Chine devienne la première
superpuissance du monde les 2 ou 3 décennies suivantes, celle-ci a besoin d’un mélange de
direction géniale, croissance économique, modernisation (pas occidentalisation), mentalité
chinoise et “le chemin chinois de la vie” (les dernières deux basées sur Tao). Si un seul
élément de cette combinaison ne fonctionnera pas comme il faut, ce “rêve chinois” ne pourra
pas être accompli.
Keywords: China, geohistory, naval strategy, geostrategy, economic policies, economic
resources, strategic advantages, strategic vulnerabilities, Central Asia, regional hegemony.
Introduction
Indeed, in  terms of geopolitical perspectives,  nowadays  China is  living
interesting times.
Samuel Huntington predicted that, after the end of the Cold War, China will have
to choose between two goals: “... to become the champion of Chinese Culture, the core
state civilization magnet toward which all other Chinese communities would orient
themselves, and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century,
as the hegemonic power in East Asia”
2. In our century – at least apparently, there is a
third possibility for China: to build the most powerful economy in the world.
Undoubtedly, China is nowadays the second economic power of the world and
its admirers consider that it would become the first power (including militarily) in the
near  future, surpassing USA. The sceptical analysers consider  that  China  cannot
become a superpower too quickly because its “economic miracle” will end as all
2 Samuel  P.  Huntington, The  Clash  of  Civilizations  and  the  Remaking  of  World  Order,
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miracles of this type
3.
The authors of this paper will try to offer to the reader information concerning
geohistorical  background and  geostrategy of  the  country, its  economic  resources,
“strong”  and  “week”  points of  its  general  geopolitics, which could  clarify  these
opposing views.
The final conclusions could perhaps help to get a right answer: will be or will
be not possible for China to surpass and replace the global power of USA?
Geohistorical background
Historical past of a so large country, with an ancient, conservative culture and
civilization, undoubtedly influence its nowadays geopolitics, giving to the Chinese
people a general sentiment of pride and superiority over other nations.
The Chinese people, according to an anthropologic point of view, belong to
the Asian sub-race, eastern type or Pacific, that is closest to the median Mongolian
anthropologic  features  and  live  mainly  in  the  central-eastern  and  north-eastern
regions of China
4.
One  of  the  first  document  certifications  of  China  was Zhongguo,  meaning
Middle  Kingdom or The Centre of  the  World
5.  If  for  the  ancient  civilizations
acculturation  and  people  or  (and)  idea  exchange  were  characteristic,  China  got
highlighted  even  from  the  beginning  by Sino-centrism  and  blatantly  disregard
towards the rest of the world. The Chinese Imperial ideology considered China to be
The  Sky  Dynasty,  the centre of  the  civilized  world,  all  of  the  other  states  being
considered vassal and tributary to the suzerain Chinese empire. In the case of ancient
China,  the  main  characteristics  were demographic  gigantism,  space  unity  and
civilization cohesion
6.
The Chinese population history is tightly tied to the two great rivers, Yellow
(Chin. Huang He) and Blue (Chin. Yangtze, or Chang Jiang, i.e. “The Long River”),
but also to the coast area of the Yellow Sea and of the Eastern Chinese Sea. This
piece of land is very favourable to agriculture and it represents the cradle of the
Chinese civilization and even nowadays it is the most densely populated area in all of
3 George Friedman, Următorul deceniu. De unde venim ... şi încotro ne îndreptăm [The next
decade: Where We’ve Been … and Where We’re Going], translated from English into
Romanian by Radu Cristian Pop, Bucharest, Litera Publishing House, 2011,p. 219. The
first edition: George Friedman, The next decade: Where We’ve Been … and Where We’re
Going, New York et al., Double Day, Random House Inc, 2011.
4 Alexandru Ungureanu, Ionel Muntele, Geografia populaţiei [Geography of Population], Iaşi,
Sedcom Libris Publishing House, 2006, p. 127.
5 Michael  Lynch, China:  de  la  Imperiu  la  Republica  Populară  1900-1949 [China:  from
Empire  to  People’s  Republic  1900-1949],  translated  from  English  into  Romanian  by
Simona  Ceauşu,  Bucharest,  Bic  All  Publishing  House,  2004,  p.  5.  The  first  edition:
Michael Lynch, China: from Empire to People’s Republic 1900-1949, London, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1996.
3 Silviu Neguţ, Horia C. Matei, Ion Nicolae, Caterina Radu, Enciclopedia Asiei [Encyclopedia
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China. The development of the Chinese population in the Great Chinese Plain and
alongside the Yellow Sea coastline was determined by the less favourable conditions
from the West, but which provided a natural protection for the Middle Kingdom.
During the course of history, in the South-West, China was protected by the Himalaya
Mountains and by the Tibet plain and in the East, the Xin Jiang area was protected by
the Takla-Makan desert and also by the Tian Shan Mountains. In the northern side,
facing Mongolia, it was protected by the Gobi desert
7.
The northern side was always exposed to invasions, this flank being the most
vulnerable to invasions, as demonstrated by the Xiong-nu, Jurken, Mongol and later
the  Manchurian  and  Japanese  incursions  (it  wasn`t  by  accident  that  the  Chinese
emperors built the greatest defensive structure of all times , The Great Wall). This
way, in the ancient period, the greatest threat to China was the northern civilizations
of Altaic
8 origin, named by the Chinese Xiong-nu, which managed to organize an
empire around the year 210 BC
9.
In the medieval period, China was the most advanced state in the world in
terms of administration and technology, being strong on both continent and sea. In
1382, the Chinese defeated the Mongols, all of the survivors being castrated, a part of
them being enrolled in the army and the others being used as servants
10. The eunuchs
became the emperors trusted group and they extended their influence, entering into
conflict with the mandarins – state officials, trained after the Confucian way
11. This
7 Marius  Lungu, Atlas  geografic  general [Geographical General  Atlas],  Constanţa,  Steaua
Nordului Publishing House, 2009, pp. 44-45.
8 The Hiong-nu tribes did not belong to the altaic family, fact highlighted even by the Chinese
writings, as they were not so tall, robust, with a big, round head, oblique eyes, prominent
cheekbones and a flat nose. They used to live in tents made out of felt and their main
occupation was cattle breeding on large surfaces of the steppe. For further details, see
Jean-Paul  Roux, Asia Centrală. Istorie  şi  Civilizaţie [Central  Asia.  History  and
Civilization], translated from French intor Romanian by Lucia Postelnicu Pop, Bucharest,
Artemis  Publishing  House,  2007,  pp.  84-85.  The  first  edition:  Jean-Paul  Roux, L'Asie
centrale, histoire et civilisation, Paris, Fayard, 1997.
9 The most truthful opinion is that the Hiong-nu population is a Prototurkish one because the
Tukiu tribes,  one  of  the  first  Turkish  tribes  in  history,  consider  themselves  a  being
descendants of the Hiong-nu tribes and are aware of the belonging to the same family. The
military  superiority  of  the  Hiong-nu  tribes  was  given  by  the  cavalry  and  by  the
manoeuvring abilities in battle. For further details see Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China
and its enemies: the rise of nomadic power in East Asia history, Cambridge University
Press, 2003, p. 276.
10 Gavin Menzies, 1421 – Anul în care China a descoperit lumea [1421 – The Year China
discovered the Word], translated from English into Romanian by Luttmann Pia Maria,
Martina  Gabriela, Gheorghiu  Adriana,  Bucharest,  House  of  Guides  Publishing  House,
2007,  p.  39.  The  first  edition:  Gavin  Menzies, 1421:  The  Year  China  Discovered  the
World, London, Bentam Press, 2002.
11 On  one  side,  being  guardians  of  the  harem,  spies  for  the  Emperor,  officers  and  high
dignitaries. On the other side, the Confucian ethics inoculated the mandarins a moral code
that was meant to remove the possibility that people could disturb Tao - the balance of theChina at the beginning of 3
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way, in the beginning of the Ming dynasty, two camps were formed with different
opinions: on one side, the eunuch’s side – adept of the Mongol traditions of military
and economic expansion (they began sea campaigns for new discoveries and charting)
and religious plurality (a great number of eunuchs were Muslims); and on the other
side,  the  mandarin  camp – conservators,  xenophobe,  adepts  of  continental
isolationism.  This  confrontation  was  to  mark  the  destiny  of  the  Ming  dynasty,
separating  the  reign  into  two  periods  depending  on  the  group  that  had  control,
meaning: 1364-1450 when China, under the influence of the eunuchs, has continued
the Mongol tradition of commercial and military expansion, and the second reign
(1449-1644) after the battle lost by the Chinese against the Mongols in the year 1449
at Tu-Mu, when the power was taken forever by the mandarin party, moment which
lead to the end of the Chinese offensive and the start of the decline. This way, the
Mandarins decided to quit the expansionist and external commercial plans, to destroy
the fleet, to pull back China from the southern routes, this vacuum being occupied by
the European sea powers
12. Self-isolation occurred in a moment in which China held
the supremacy, compared to Europe, on sea and in the field of scientific discoveries in
all domains
13.
China was undoubtedly a regional power until in the 19
th century, when this
status was seriously challenged by England, Russia and Japan
14. The Middle Kingdom
is  again a  great  power only  in the  second  half of  the  twentieth  century, in the
communist period imposed by Mao Zedong in 1949, but then, as a land power, had to
face the challenge of a sea power, i.e. USA.
Antagonism between land and sea powers was best theorized by the British
geostrategist Halford. J. Mackinder. He had created a bipolar system, splitting the
world into sea powers and continental powers, after a history interpretation scheme by
a geographical prism, grid taken also by Karl Haushofer, which defines with the help
forces of nature. The mandarins were conservatives and they considered peasants as being
the backbone of society, and foreigners and traders as being disturbing elements to Tao.
For further details, see Gavin Menzies, 1421 – Anul în care China a descoperit lumea, p 40.
12 Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and geopolitical change, Baltimore (USA), Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2006, pp 123-125.
13 For example, in 1421, the great Chinese fleet, lead by the Muslim eunuch admiral Zheng
He,  started  to  chart  the  world  was  formed  by  317  ships  and  28,000  people,  while
Columbus went to sea with only 4 ships and 150 sailors; the Chinese fleet flagship was
almost four time bigger than the Santa Maria from the Columbus fleet and the smallest
ship from the Zheng He fleet was twice as big as the Spanish galleons. In the year 1500,
the Chinese imperial court decreed the ban of ship building, and a remarkable technologic
advance and strategic advantage was disrupted for a couple of centuries; for further details,
see Paul Dobrescu, Viclenia Globalizării. Asaltul asupra puterii americane [The trickery
of globalization. The assault on the American power], Iaşi, European Institute Publishing
House, 2010, p. 151.
14 See  on  this  aspects  especially  Henry  Kissinger, On  China [On  China],  translated  from
English into Romanian by Vladimir Borţun and Dan Flonta, Bucharest, Comunicare.ro
Publishing House, 2012, pp. 38-80. The First Edition: Henry Kissinger, On China, New
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of an metaphor, promoted by Alfred T. Mahan - sea powers strategy to surround with
the help of a series of military bases the Eurasian mass and afterwards to suppress the
continental powers – i.e. the so-called anaconda strategy. During the Cold War, the
bipolar scheme was inevitable, in which the sea powers of the world would be lead by
the  United  States  of  America,  leader  of  the  democratic  world,  and  managing  to
surround the continental powers, communists at that time, represented by the U.R.S.S.
and China. This eventually led to the containment strategy scheme introduced by
George  Kennan,  which  actually  represented a  core of the  American  strategy  in a
bipolar world
15.
Washington's strategy was to push the American sea force into the influence
zone of China, fact that displeased Beijing, considering it, exactly as it was, a form of
encirclement.  This  way,  China  could  not  harness  its  dual  geographic  nature – a
striking continental dimension and a strong oceanic perspective. We also highlight the
fact  that,  for  Beijing,  the  option  for  continental  dimensions  would  involve  a
competition on the Eurasian mass, more precisely in Central Asia and Siberia, with
Russia, whereas the ocean competition would involve a competition with the U.S.A.,
especially in the Pacific Ocean. Our own point of view is that China acts on two
fronts – one on the eastern side – on sea, and the west one – continental, reiterating its
ancient appellation of The Middle Empire
16.
Until now, both scholars and average people from China consider the 19
th and
the first half of the 20
th century a period of “humiliation” of their country by the
foreigners,  which ended in  1949. We consider that  this  generalized perception
plays a major role in building China's current geostrategy (and, subsequently,
geopolitics).
China’s current naval strategy (Chin. Haijun Zhanlue)
Nowadays China’s geostrategy is generally based on a naval strategy. It was
elaborated approximately in 1982 by Admiral Liu Huaquing and states the gradual
expansion of China`s sea interests, crossing from a coastal defence to an offshore
defence, and as perspective, the projection of force in the Planetary Ocean (Engl.
“Blue water strategy”).
For the achievement of this strategy, in the first stage, the expansion of the sea
protection till the first island chain (Engl. “brown-water theory”) is essential, the
chain  expanding  from  Vladivostok  in  the  North,  till  the  Strait  of Malacca  in  the
South. In the second stage, programmed for 2020-2040, the Chinese navy (and air
force) will have to secure the perimeter of the second islands chain (Chin. Di’er
Daolian; Engl. “green-water theory”). It holds in North the Kurile Islands, including
the Bonin and Marian islands and Papua New Guinea to the South. In this phase of its
strategy, it is supposed that China will be able to develop a naval capacity at least
15 Ibid., p. 22.
16 Victor Ionescu, Caspica – ambientul geopolitic şi geostrategic [Caspica – geopolitical and
geostrategical ambient], in „GeoPolitica”, Top Form Publishing House, Bucharest, no.16-
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equal to the one owned by the U.S.A.
17.
Quite worrying for his adversaries are the estimations made by two U.S. think-
tanks (CSBA and RAND): China is able by 2020 to fulfil the strategy regarding the
first island chain
18.
All  the  same,  George  Friedman  consider  that China  needs generations of
people to build a true naval power, not only technically speaking, but also in order to
transfer experience from one generation to another, which is the only way to get good
admirals. In his opinion, Chinese navy will not be able in the next decade to eliminate
the American navy from China’s regional waters
19.
It  is  interesting  to remark that  nowadays  China  holds  the  stealth  plane
technology, is building fighter carriers and has made great progress in the field of
military satellites
20.
We estimate that the presence of the American naval forces in the proximity of
the Chinese coast hinders for this country not only the valuing of the sea scale but
also of the continental one. We cannot ignore the fact that the continental perspective
has become very attractive to Beijing, once the dissolution of the Soviet Union has
started. Also, Beijing was forced to discover new oil reserves at the Central Asian
border, fact which determined China to intensify its efforts to stabilize the Xinjiang
province and furthermore to modernize it.
China did not hesitate to take advantage of the U.R.S.S. dissolution, jump-
starting its relations with the countries in Central Asia, Beijing manifesting strategic
interests  in  that  area.  China  had  a  rather  reserved  strategy  towards  Central  Asia,
incorporated  in  a flexible tactic,  without  generating  tensions  in  the  relations with
other states. The development of a new type of strategy attracted regional powers into
China`s sphere of influence, and the term continental, Eurasian expansion of China
was symbolized by the initiation and expansion of the Cooperation Organization from
Shanghai, in alternative to the expansion of N.A.T.O., counteracting the American
interests in Central Asia. For China, the creation and development of the organization
meant establishing some links with regional powers – Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran,
but also with countries that possess great amounts of hydrocarbons, including the
ones not exploited – Russia, Iran, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan. The energetic
constraints determined by the industrial development rhythm have forced China to
17 Vasile Simileanu, Geopolitica spaţiului islamic [Geopolitics of the Islamic space], vol. 3,
Spaţiul  Islamic – geopolitică  aplicată – [Islamic  space:  implemented  geopolitics],
Bucharest, Top Form Publishing House, 2009, pp. 173-176. See also a comprehensive
description of this strategy in Stacy A. Pedrozo, China’s Active Defense Strategy and its
Regional  Impact,  in http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/transcripts/11_01_27_
trans/pedrozo_testimony.pdf. Accessed in 15.11.2012
18 http://www.economist.com/node/21552193. Accessed in 15.11.2012
19 George Friedman, op. cit., pp. 216-217.
20 Stéphane  Marchand, Când  China  va  învinge [When  China  Will  Win],  translated  from
French into Romanian by Constantinescu Nicolae, Bucharest, Pro Editură şi Tipografie
Printing House, 2008, pp. 81, 214. The first edition: Quand la Chine veut veincre, Paris,
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exploit raw materials from the exterior, Central Asia representing the best choice
because of the close proximity, that lead to low transportation costs.
Economic policies and resources
The  Chinese  economy  was  until  1978  a  typical one for  a  communist,
developing country. In that time, the vice-premier Deng Xiaoping launched some
profound  reforms,  in  order  to  modernize  Chinese  economy  and  society.  These
reforms were implemented in the following fields of activity: agriculture, industry,
science and technology, defence, foreign
21. The most important reform implemented
in the time of this visionary leader was that concerning the direct foreign investments
in China. Actually, nowadays Chinese “economic miracle” is based on this reform,
very well described by Joan Edelman Spero.
“Another major change for China is its new interest in encouraging foreign
direct investment and joint ventures with the West. As in many developing countries,
China hopes to benefit from technology transfers embodied in these investments and
also  to  take  advantage  of  revenues  generated  from  the  exports  created  by  these
companies. China has  taken  many  steps  to  encourage  foreign  investment  but  has
found it difficult to provide an environment that is attractive to foreign investors. It
has opened five special economic zones (SEZs), which encourage foreign investment
and  production  for  export  by  offering favourable tax  treatment,  special  profit
repatriation agreements, and other inducements to foreign investors. Fourteen other
coastal cities offer similar incentives. A joint-venture law was passed in April 1988,
to provide a legal framework for foreigners doing business in China”
22.
After 1990 China became a big importer of raw material extremely necessary
for  its  accelerated  development.  Therefore,  the  external  Chinese  politics  followed
prevalently  the  development  of  the  relationship  with  the  countries  rich  in  raw
material.  The  Chinese  companies  made  great  investments  in  African  countries  as
Sudan, Angola, Zimbabwe, South American as Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Porto
Rico.  Also,  they  made  investments  in  Asian  countries  as  Kazakhstan,  Iran,
Turkmenistan, Burma and in countries from the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Yemen, rich in oil and natural gas.
China  made  as  a  main  goal  the  performance  development  of  its  multinational
companies, which are State companies, considering their transformation in global players.
They are usually sustained by preferential financing, tax exemption and political support
on the international arena, in order to become authentic multinational companies. China
explicitly  began  a  program  for  big  cross-border  acquisitions.  The  objective  of  these
acquisitions is to assure for China the access to raw material, technology, know-how,
managerial and layout abilities, producers, providers and business markets.
We  will  present  to  the  reader  a  brief  statistic  concerning  the economic
resources of China.
21 Joan  Edelman  Spero, The  Politics  of  International  Economic  Relations, fourth  edition,
London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 337-338.
22 Ibid., p. 340.China at the beginning of 3
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Coal stocks. China is among the three states that have more than 70% of the
possible coal stocks, together with Russia and USA
23. All the same, China comes to
the front with the fact that it brings about 33% of the world production for superior
coal and in 2008 it had stocks of about 114.5 thousand million tons of coal
24.
Therefore, Beijing is nowadays on the first place as a world coal producer
having a quota of 2/5 of the world production, this fact having an important role in
covering the electricity for the country. Consequently, the coals have a big influence,
representing 4/5 in the energetic balance of China. The coals are the main source for
the energetic industry of the country
25.
China has 62.2 thousand million tons of coal and 52.3 thousand million tons of
lignite, according to the estimations done in 1999
26. The main coal catchment area are
in the North-Eastern China, in Fushun and Benxi regions, in the North of the country,
in Tayiuan and Datong regions, in Shanxi and Shenxi provinces, in the Central part,
in Eastern and South-Eastern part
27.
Oil and natural gas stocks. China has oil stocks of 2.1 thousand million tons,
being known, in 2008, as having an oil production of 189.7 thousand million tons,
representing 4.8% of the world production
28. Despite the high oil production, China is
one  of  the  biggest  oil  importers  in  order  to  preserve  its  industrial  development
rhythm, considering that, in 2008, it burned 375.7 thousand million tons of oil
29.
Important oil exploitations are in North China, in Takeng area and Shengli region –
the delta of the Huang He River and in the area of the Bohai bay. Other extraction
areas are in North-Western China, in Xinjiang region and North-Eastern China in
Songliao
30 province. Concerning the purification capacity it is known that, in 2008,
China held the world second place with 8.7% capacity
31.
Likewise, according to the statistics, in 2008, China held the world ninth place
among the producer countries for natural gas, with a rate of 76.1 thousand million
cubic meters, representing 2.5% of the global production and having stocks of 2460
thousand million cubic meters
32.
Electricity. In 2007, China held the world second place in the top of electricity
producers, having a percentage of 15.1% of the whole world amount
33.
23 Silviu  Neguţ  (Coordinator)  et  al., Geografie  economică  mondială [World  Economic
Geography], Bucharest, Meteor Press Publishing House, 2009, p. 36.
24 Ibid., p. 37.
25 Ibid., p. 46.
26 Bebe Negoiescu, Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, Geografie economică. Resursele Terrei [Economic
geography. Earth’s resources], Bucharest, Meteor Press Publishing House, 2003, p. 135.
27 Ibid., p. 140.
28 Silviu Negut (Coordinator) et al., op, cit., pp. 51-52.
29 Ibid., pp. 60, 64.
30 Bebe Negoiescu, Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, op.cit., p. 123.
31 Silviu Negut (Coordinator) et al., op.cit., p. 63.
32 Ibid., p. 70.
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Iron ore stocks. In 2008, China was the main world producer for iron ore with
a yield of 770 thousand million tons, being also the most important importer of iron
ore. In 2008, China was on the first place for the steel production with 513 thousand
million  tons,  representing  37.7%  of  the  world  production
34.  The  main  bases  of
metallurgy are situated in the North-Eastern China, at Anshan, Shenyang, Fushun,
Benxi. In the North part there are metallurgy bases at Tayuan and Beinjing and in the
Central part there are metallurgy bases at Wuhan and Maanshar
35.
In 2008, China had the first world production for the cast iron and iron alloy
with 478 thousand million tons, representing half of the world production
36.
Copper stocks. China is on the fourth world place for the copper ore production
with 1000 thousand tons, representing 6.4 % from the world amount and the second
place for the purified copper production with 2 150 000 tons in 2006, representing
14% of the world total amount
37.
Aluminium stocks. China  is  the  second  world  producer for bauxite  with
more than 15% of the world production and in 2008 it was on the first place for
the aluminium production with 13 500 000 tons, representing 34% of the world
total amount
38.
Lead stocks. In 2008 China was on the first world place for the lead production
with 1540 thousand tons, representing 40.5% of the world total amount
39.
Zinc stocks. In 2008, China was on the first world place for the zinc production
with 3,200,000 tons, representing 28.3% of the world production
40.
Tin stocks (i.e. Sn, Staniu). In 2008, China was on the first world place for the
tin production with 150 000 tons, representing 45% of the world total amount
41.
Tin stocks. China has 27% of the tin world stocks
42.
Gold stocks. In 2008 China was on the first world place for the gold production
with 295 tons, representing 12.7% from world total amount
43.
Silver  stocks. China  was  on  the  third  world  place  in  2008  for  the  silver
production with 2 600 tons, representing 12.4% from world total amount
44.
High industrial fields. In 2008 China was on the second world place for the
vehicles production, representing 13.2% from world total amount and in 2003, on
the  third  world  place  for  the  commercial  ship  production,  having  11.3% from
world total amount
45.
34 Ibid., pp. 97, 104.
35 Bebe Negoiescu, Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, op.cit., p. 198.
36 Silviu Negut (Coordinator), op.cit., p. 105.
37 Ibid., pp. 116-117.
38 Ibid., p. 120.
39 Ibid., p. 121.
40 Ibid., p. 122.
41 Ibid., p. 124.
42 Bebe Negoiescu, Gheorghe Vlăsceanu, op. cit., p. 35.
43 Silviu Negut (Coordinator), op.cit., p. 125.
44 Ibid., p. 127.
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Forestry assets. China has 1 882 000 square kilometres of forest
46.
Sea resources. China extracts from sea waters salt (by water evaporation), as
well as bromine and magnesium
47.
China is on the second world place for the algae consumption and for the sea
farms, aquatic crops which follow the reproduction and the growing of aquatic animal
and vegetal organisms under the man direct assistance (in this top, Japan is on the
first place)
48.
The  gross  production  value  in  China  of  the  marine  industries  grew  yearly
arriving in 2006 at 275 thousand dollars, a 13.97% growth in comparison with the
previous year, representing 10.01% of the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP).
The value added of the marine industries was of 162.1 thousand millions US dollars
and their percentage in GDP grew to 4.01%
49.
Fishing  field. In  2007,  China  was  on  the  first  world  place  for  the  fish’s
quantity with 49.5 thousand million tons
50.
Rice production. In 2007 China was the main world rice producer with 187
thousand million tons, representing 28.7% of the world production
51.
Wheat production. In 2007 China was on the first world place for the wheat
production  with  109.8  thousand  million  tons,  representing  18.1%  of  the  world
production
52.
Maize production. In 2007 China was on the second world place for the maize
production with 152 thousand million tons, representing 19.4% of the total amount
53.
These figures are impressive. All the same, China is relatively poor in mineral
resources,  the  stock  per  capita  being  at  the  half  of  the  world  average.  90%  and
respectively 80% of oil and coal stocks are found in the Northern part of the country.
In Xinjiang is the largest affluence of oil, gas, copper and iron, but natural resources
are also found in Tibet. The South and South-Eastern regions, the most dynamic
economically, are generally lacking in natural resources. Most of the time, is more
advantageous for the Chinese government to get supplies from the importation than
bring raw material from the North mainland China.
In  order  to maintain its high growth rate, China  will  need in the  future of
massive  imports,  including  hydrocarbons and  raw  material. This  fact  require
increasingly  more  money,  which  must  to  be  obtained  generally  from  difference
between imports and exports, China being doomed to export more and more.
46 Ibid., p. 165.
47 Ibid., p. 16
48 Ibid., pp. 17, 18.
49 http://mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/communique/2006/200711/t20071108_660721.htm [Ministry
of Land and Resources of the People’s Republic of China]. Accessed in 07.11.2012
50 Silviu Negut (Coordinator), op.cit., p. 201.
51 Ibid., p. 214.
52 Ibid., p. 212.
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Strategic vulnerabilities
Although it is the third country in terms of stretch on the globe (after Russia
and Canada), occupying almost 7% of Earth`s surface, and the first country in terms
of  demographical  density  because  it  holds  20%  of  the  world’s  population,  China
confronts itself with a series of vulnerabilities which mainly affects its continental
dimension. As we mentioned before, the affirmation as an Eurasian power, involves
in Beijing that this dimension would be in detriment to Moscow.
A  major  imbalance  that  could  influence  the  capitalization  continental
perspective  is  the  demographical  decrease.  This  way,  in  the  western  half  of  the
country, formed out of mountains and high plateaus with an arid climate, which does
not favour living, only 6% of the Chinese population lives there
54. Instead, most of
the Chinese population, the rest of 94%, lives in the eastern side, on the coastal line,
on  the  valleys  of  the  3  major  rivers  of  South-Eastern  and  North-Eastern  China
(moreover, eastern China hosts the highest demographical density in the world).
In Northern China it is located the Yellow River, which has a lower water volume,
in the centre of the country is the Yangtze River, transporting a volume of water 20 times
higher than the Yellow River, and in the South, the Zhujiang River, about 6 times more
abundant in water than the Yellow River. In the river bed of Yangtze are living almost
450 million inhabitants that provide 40% of the Chinese GDP.
In the inferior water catchment area is situated the Shanghai metropolis which
along with the surrounding area assures about 10% of the Chinese GDP.
Also,  we  can  notice  the  fact  that  the  western  part  of  China  is  not  only
underpopulated  but  also  the  most  underdeveloped,  and  the  Tibet  and  Xianjiang
provinces, that could be the launching ramp of the continentals politics, are inhabited
mostly  by  minorities  with  self-government  tendencies  and  which  have  different
religious beliefs
55, showing only hostility to Beijing.
Major imbalances are also generated by the accelerated development of the
demographic and economical with some severe consequences in terms of ecology and
food supplies. In China, only 25% of the country holds high agricultural potential,
compared to 60% in the case of the U.S.A. and 80% in the case of Europe. Thus, the
population  number  and  the  accelerated  economical  growth  of  China  worsens  this
balance and accentuates the pressure over the land, over the forests, over the water
sources, which can lead to a permanent ecological crisis in the next 50 years
56.
We  also  should  not  ignore  the  option  between  the  continental  and  sea
dimension,  which  were  experimented  ever  the  course  of  history  by  China,  with
different  outcomes.  This  way,  China’s  history,  influenced  by  the  necessity  of
resolving internal issues, was dominated in certain periods by Sino-centrism, aspect
which emphasized the continental dimension of the country. However, the option for
continentalism meant an historical failure, as it happened in the 15
th and 19
th century,
54 Paul Dobrescu, Viclenia globalizării. Asaltul asupra puterii americane, pp. 146, 148.
55 Ibid., p. 148.
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when  China  provoked  its  cut  from  the  sea.  Instead,  the  option  for  the  sea  way,
dominated  especially  by  economical  interests,  has  coincided  with  a  period  of
development, the period of reference being the 15
th century.
In the last decades, China has rethought the ratio between continental and sea
dimension, not by moving the capital from Beijing, but moving the countries centre of
development to the coast zone, in the Shanghai area. This way, China now tries to
make  the  transition  from  the  continental  power to  the  continental-ocean  power,
having in mind that, over the course of history, there were powers that followed a
similar course of transformation with success (a successful case of this continental-
sea synthesis are the United States of America)
57.
Strategic advantages
The  East-Asian  economy  is  built  on  a  Chinese  network,  made  by  the
technological  capacity  of Taiwan,  the  entrepreneurial  abilities  of  Hong  Kong,  the
network  communications  of  Singapore,  all  of  them  being  completed  by  a  huge
amount  of  financial  capital  and  a  strong  base  of  land,  resources  and  work  of
continental China. Westerners or Japanese cannot do business in China as well as
Chinese.  This  situation  which  confers  a  great  strategic  advantage  for  China  was
brilliantly described by Samuel Huntington.
“The  emergence  of  the  greater  China  co-prosperity  sphere  was  greatly
facilitated by a “bamboo network” of family and personal relationships a common
culture. Overseas Chinese are much more able than either Westerners of Japanese to
do business in China. In China trust and commitment depend on personal contacts,
not contracts of laws and other legal documents. Western businessmen find it easier
to do business in India than in China where the sanctity of an agreement rests on the
personal relationship between the parties”
58.
The welfare field of the Chinese economic network is strong through the ethnic
and economical pillars, causing the domination of Beijing in the entire South-East
Asia. This domination is strongly helped by a “network of Chinese merchants in
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia”
59.
Lately, the vector of demographic evolution is spreading towards North, where
is a low density, towards Mongolia and Siberia
60.
It is noticeable that the Chinese economical success does not matter on the
existence of different political regimes, even though they are in conflict (Beijing –
Taipei). The ideological differences, existent only in political plan affects only the
unitary development of the Chinese economical potential.
In  parallel,  the  demographic  expansion  in  the  North,  along  with  economic
interests,  could  entail,  in  perspective,  a  reconsideration  of  the  continental  vision,
taking into consideration the competition with Russia for Siberia.
57 Ibid., p. 152.
58 Samuel Huntington, op. cit., p. 170.
59 Ibid.
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Although, in social plan, it has the capacity to generate certain vulnerabilities,
the demographic element plays an important part in economical plan. Thus, on one
part, China can have a large amount of cheap workforce, which, as we notice, Beijing
did  not  hesitate  to  use  it  for  the  construction  of  some  large projects  in  the
infrastructure area – the true base of economical development. On the other hand, as
happened on the course of history, China, especially with the current economical
prosperity that displays, represents the biggest market in the world
61.
Central Asia and China’s strategy
The  Chinese  economy  is  a  high  energy  consumer  and  requires  massive
import, and in this case Beijing takes into consideration the development of some
safe supply routes and neighbours without internal issues. As we observed, even
though I does not benefit from an Eurasian policy in the North-West part of the
country, yet the requirements of oil and gas supply cannot determinate Beijing to
ignore the Central-Asian potential, even if it involves an economic competition with
Moscow.  Besides,  China  does  not  hesitate  to  develop  partnerships  in  terms  of
energy even with Kazakhstan – the main state that sustains the Russian policy in the
area. So, in 1997, China and Kazakhstan created a partnership involving a pipeline
from  the  Caspian  Sea  to  Xinjiang  (962 kilometres in  length),  which  became
functional in 2005. Also, in 2005, China acquired a Kazakh energy company in the
disadvantage of a Russian concern (Lukoil). In the same time, China was allowed to
exploit important deposits in Kazakhstan; thereby the presence of Beijing balanced
the Russian interests in the area
62.
We emphasize that this policy promoted by China in Central Asia, generated
by  strict  economic  necessities,  is  not  limited  only  to  Kazakhstan.  Nowadays,  in
Central  Asia,  China  is  building  roads,  factories,  power  stations  and  pipelines  for
hydrocarbons transportation. In spite of the massive investments in the area, it is
observed reluctance against Chinese investments from Central-Asian countries. So,
with all the benefits from its presence in Central Asia, there are concerns that the
cheap products made in China could affect local markets, being involved the risk of
immigration, by the rise in the number of Han population established in Central-Asian
region
63.
China’s strategy for Central Asia was established on three directives:
1. The stability of Central Asia means stability in its Western regions and in
Xinjiang;
61 Paul  Dobrescu, Geopolitica [Geopolitics], Bucharest,  Comunicare.ro  Publishing  House,
2003, p. 196.
62 Constantin Ionuţ, Evoluţii Geopolitice în Asia Centrală: Politica României faţă de statele
din  regiune  (1991-2007) [Geopolitical  evolutions  in  Central  Asia:  Romania’s  policy
towards  the  region  states],  Bucharest,  Top  Form:  Univers  Ştiinţific  Publishing  House,
2011, pp. 99.
63 Hélène Carrère D’Encausse, URSS a murit, trăiască Rusia, [USSR Died, Long Live Russia],
translated  from  French  into  Romanian  by  Lucia  Postelnicu  Pop,  Bucharest,  Artemis
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2.  The  implication  in  the  Central-Asian  dynamics  means  the  supply  with
energy  and  other  strategic  resources,  and  also  breaking  the  United  States  and
N.A.T.O.’s encirclement;
3. The domination of Central Asia could ensure and increase China’s influence
in the Middle East, South Asia, Caucasus and Afghanistan. A powerful position in the
area (i.e. Central Asia) could open the access to new markets for its products and new
ways of access to European markets.
Besides,  it  is  estimated  that  in  the  future  China  will  increase  its  political-
economic influence in the Central Asian area by strengthening its external partner
status, dominant in the mentioned area
64. Stating that, for economic reasons, China
increased  its  ambitions  and  regional  influence,  depicting  a  progressive  interest  in
energy–rich states in Central Asia
65, but an important part in this direction is played
by the fear of a possible attraction of the Eastern Turkmenistan in relation to Central-
Asian  states.  We  notice  that  this  force  of  attraction  could  be  powered  by  ethno-
linguistic and confessional aspects. Thereby, it might be taken into account that the
large Uyghur community  from Xinjiang might want to share the same history as
Turkish and Muslim states from Central Asia.
The  whole  Chinese  strategy  for  Central  Asia  means  the  creation  of  an
economic and political dependence, to use it both for providing resources and for
obstruction of the American influence in this area
66. We emphasize that, from this
point of view, respectively stopping the American influence in the area, the Chinese
interests are the same as the Russian ones and were materialized by founding the
Shanghai  Cooperation  Organization.  It  is necessary  to  highlight  that  the  Chinese-
Russian  alliance  has  nothing  but  a  situational  nature,  forced  to  solve  a  problem
generated  by  punctual  and  immediate  strategic  necessities,  i.e.  the  prevention  of
American intrusion in the area. However, the Russian-Chinese cooperation is not able
to  solve  the  background  of  the  issue,  given  the  existence  of  some  historical
disagreements in the bilateral relations on the areas of influence owned in Central
Asia  and  Siberia. Inevitably,  by  putting  again  into  question  the  areas  under  the
Chinese influence in Central Asia would induce a gradual tension of the relations with
Moscow, that wants to strengthen its position in the area through various projects
(Eurasian  Union,  Collective  Security  Treaty  Organization),  even  with  a  political-
military collision perspectives. We also consider that Moscow itself is forced to take
into  consideration  an  eventual  economic  consolidation  of  China  by  accessing  the
maritime dimension, with internal implications in the development of North-Western
64 Constantin Ionuţ, op. cit., p. 103.
65 Zbigniew  Brzezinski, Marea  tablă  de  şah.  Supremaţia  americană  şi  imperativele  sale
geostrategice, [The  Grand  Chessboard:  American  Primacy  and  Its Geostrategic
Imperatives], translated  from  English  into  Romanian  by  Aureliana  Ionescu,  Bucharest,
Univers  Enciclopedic  Printing  House,  2000,  pp.186. The  first  edition:  Zbigniew
Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives,
BasicBooks, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1997.
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parts of the country. This fact would allow Beijing to take into consideration the
continental option.
Beijing’s lack of trust in Moscow could be revealed by the fact that, nowadays,
China prefers not to be dependent only on Russia’s natural resources. In consequence, we
consider that Beijing cannot put its source of power, the economy, at risk and to depend
on the oil and gas provided by Moscow. Thereby, China is more and more economically
present in Africa, where are many important oil reserves
67, and other types of natural
resources necessary for sustaining the fast developing industry of Beijing
68.
China’s first objective: regional hegemony
We consider that China’s immediate perspective doesn’t imply a confrontation
with  Russia,  because  Beijing  has  to  solve  issues  regarding  other regional  powers
competitors, such as India and Japan.
So, geography is an important factor that dictates China’s interest to ally with
Pakistan and establish a military presence in Burma, the geostrategic target of this
initiative being India. China’s close military cooperation with Pakistan is blocking
India’s  possibilities  to  gain  regional  hegemony  in  South  Asia  and  to  become  a
geopolitical competitor of China. The military cooperation with Burma, for China
represents the direct access to the Indian Ocean and the possibility of strategic control
in the Strait of Malacca, which can filter Japan’s access to Middle Eastern oil and
European markets
69.
The  Chinese  strategy  diverts  from  the  two  major  objectives  of  its  external
policy regarding, on a global scale U.S.A., and on a regional scale, other strong states
which may have hegemonic claims.
Thus,  the  first  objective  of  the  Chinese  external  policy  is  blocking  the
American hegemony and power politics, avoiding at the same time a military conflict,
which could block China’s rise as an economical power. In this respect, China is
counting on the anti-American resentments present on a global scale. Viewed from
this point, Beijing’s policy subordinated to the tactical development of Sino-Russian
relations is justified, given that, nowadays, Russia is from all the points of view more
vulnerable  than  China.  As  a  result,  we  notice  that,  due  to  the  Soviet  Union’s
dissolution,  Beijing  has  not hesitated  to  attract  Moscow  in  various  forms  of
cooperation to stop the American influence. Not incidentally, in 1997, Russia and
China united against the American hegemony and agreed that the N.A.T.O. expansion
is not desirable
70.
67 In Africa, are estimated to be almost 10 billion tons of oil. On the continent exists two large
areas where oil is extracted: one in the North in Sahara, which includes: Libya, Algeria,
Egypt  and  Morocco,  and  the  other area  in  the  Gulf  of  Guinea  in  the  Nigerian  zone
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va invinge [When China Will Win], pp. 284-285.
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China’s second objective is a regional strategy designed to avoid any conflicts
with  its  close neighbours,  proceeding  at  the  same  time  to  obtain  regional
domination
71. We regard that, in reality, the second objective is closely linked to the
first one, meaning that Beijing can’t afford conflicts with its stronger neighbours,
from which USA could benefit by consolidating its influence in the area. Also, these
kinds of conflicts could increase the internal weaknesses
72. For example, we believe
that a conflict with India, a demographic colossus, would weaken China in the Tibet
region, because of the support given by New Delhi to this region.
Conclusions
If China really wishes to engage in a competition for global leadership against
USA, it must preserve a high level of economic growth. The influential American
strategist  John  J.  Mearsheimer  considers  that if  China keep  a  high  level  of  its
economic growth, could became a “giant Hong Kong”. In that case, it may have a
latent power 4 times greater than that of the USA, enough for get a decisive strategic
advantage in Northeast Asia
73.
The best ally of China on the way of becoming a superpower, which could
seriously contest USA’s global hegemony, is the ancient mentality of Chinese people,
different from the Western mentality. In our opinion, a very good description of this
mentality, with its huge potential is given by Kenichi Ohmae, a well-known expert in
management. “Why, then, do good development people, well-trained professionals,
usually stop short? The answer is simple: They don’t think they are the centre of
the universe. They don’t have the China mentality – the deep, inner certainty
that they can change the world, that if anyone does change the world they will be
the  ones (our  Bold).  This  is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  NIH  (not  invented here)
syndrome that often gets in the way of productive development work. NIH sufferers
can’t  be  bothered  to  examine  or  apply  good  ideas  that  originate  elsewhere.  By
contrast,  the  China – Chu-goku,  literally  means  “centre of  universe”  mentality
provides the confidence to look at things in a new light and to push beyond the usual
answers to get at underlying causes and connections. It is a source of motivation, and
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its  effects  are inclusive.  NIH  is  a  source  of  self-satisfaction,  and  its  effects  are
exclusive”
74.
Current economic and financial mechanisms are created by Western world and
China cannot successfully compete  with the  West on  this ground. In  this  field,
China’s chance would  be that after this  economic  crisis, some more  equitable
economic and financial mechanisms to be created. Afterwards, China could perhaps
profit on this chance. This is only a hypothetical possibility.
Really speaking, in order to become the first superpower of the world in the
next 2-3 decades, China needs a mixture of brilliant leadership, economic growth,
modernization (not Westernization!)
75, Chinese mentality and “Chinese way of life”
(last  two based  on Tao). If a  single element of this  combination will  not  work
properly, this “Chinese dream” will not be achieved.
74 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy,
New York, Harper Perennial, 1991, p. 79.
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